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THE EFFECT OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ON THE
APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Ordinarily, negligence may not be inferred from the mere happening of an
accident. Evidence must be introduced to establish the causal connection be-
tween the accident and some negligent act or omission on the part of the
defendant. Sometimes, however, the circumstances of an accident are such
that this causal connection may be reasonably inferred from the mere happen-
ing of the accident, i.e., bricks fall from a building, bottles explode, glass is
found in a loaf of bread. Such an inference is based upon the common
experience of men that accidents of this type do not usually happen unless
someone has been negligent.' This inference is commonly termed res ipsa
loquitur. It is generally considered a type of circumstantial evidence.2 Courts
will allow a plaintiff the use of res ipsa loquitur where the nature of the acci-
dent warrants the application of the inference if it is also shown that the
agency or instrumentality causing the accident was in the exclusive control
of the defendant at the time of the accident and that the plaintiff did not
contribute to or play any voluntary part in the accident. 3 Naturally, it falls
upon the plaintiff to allege and prove these facts since he is seeking the benefit
of the inference. If he fails he has not brought res ipsa loquitur into the case.
This comment will deal with the problem which arises when a plaintiff is not
content to merely allege and prove facts sufficient to bring res ipsa loquitur
into application, but goes further and alleges specific facts pointing to the exact
cause of the accident or the precise negligence of the defendant.
Courts have distinguished between allegations aimed primarily at establishing
the applicability of the inference, terming these, general allegations of negli-
gence, and those attempting to establish the precise negligence of the defendant,
terming these, specific allegations of negligence.4 For example, an allegation
that a railroad crossing accident was caused by the failure of automatic warn-
ing devices to operate is pointed at, establishing only that such devices
do not ordinarily fail to operate in the absence of negligence. Hence,
this is a general allegation.5 If, howeyer, it is alleged that the accident
was caused by the failure of an intoxi6ated gate tender in the employ of
the defendant to lower the gates, the allegation is one pointing to -the precise
negligence which caused the accident. In the latter example, there is a specific
allegation. 6 Here, the plaintiff is not asking the jury to infer the defendant's
negligence from a given set of facts, rather he is telling the jury how the
accident happened and the precise connection that the defendant had with it.
General allegations have no bearing on the theory of res ipsa loquitur other
1. Prosser, Torts § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Id § 201.
3. Id § 199.
4. 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 261 (1941).
5. Henderson v. New York, Chicago, St. Louis R. Co., - Ind. -, -, 146 N.E.2d 531,
536 (1957).
6. The distinction between a general allegation of negligence and a specific allegation
of negligence is not always clear because of poor draftsmanship in the pleadings. See,
e.g., Short v. D. R. B. Logging Co., 192 Ore. 383, 235 P.2d 340 (1951).
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than to bring it into application. There is considerable disagreement, however,
as to the effect which the pleading of specific allegations will have upon a
plaintiff's use of res ipsa loquitur.
THE EFFECT OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
Generally, courts have relied on one of three theories in considering the effect
of pleading specific allegations of negligence. These theories are: (1) that the
plaintiff by merely alleging or, in some instances, by attempting to prove
specific allegations of negligence thereby waives his right to use res ipsa loqui-
tur; (2) that the plaintiff may rely on res ipsa loquitur despite his specific
allegations of negligence and without regard to his proving or attempting to
prove these "surplus" allegations; (3) that the plaintiff is "limited" in his
use of res ipsa loquitur to establishing the negligence specified in his com-
plaint.
Waiver Theory
Only a few jurisdictions apply or have applied the rule that a plaintiff by
merely pleading specific negligence thereby waives res ipsa loquitur.7 The
remainder of the jurisdictions which might be loosely classified as following
a "waiver" theory bar res ipsa loquitur when the plaintiff offers evidence of
specific negligence.8 One of the reasons set forth for this position is that res
ipsa loquitur was designed for the benefit of a plaintiff ignorant of the factors
causing his injury and that it would be inconsistent to allow a plaintiff to rely
upon res ipsa while, at the same time, attempting to prove the precise negli-
gence involved.9 Another view is that res ipsa loquitur is designed to establish
a prima facie case and, if the plaintiff establishes such a case by his direct
evidence, he loses the benefit of the doctrine. 10 Cases holding that the plaintiff
is not deprived of res ipsa loquitur unless and until he proves the precise cause
of the accident" are more properly classified in other categories. The latter
position is merely a negative statement of the truism that a party who can
prove his case by direct proof has no need of the inference of res ipsa loquitur.
The strict waiver theory, it is submitted, is based upon an unnecessary
assumption that a plaintiff seeking to use res ipsa loquitur should be totally
ignorant of the facts giving rise to the accident. The slightest indication
by the plaintiff that he knows some facts in the chain of causality lead-
7. Missouri had so held in a long line of cases illustrated by Venditti v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 42, 226 S.W.2d 599 (1950) which held the rule of that state to
be that if the plaintiff either pleads or proves specific negligence he waives his right to rely
upon res ipsa loquitur. This no longer appears to be the Missouri rule. See Williams
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 625, 253 S.W.2d 97 (1952). Kansas apparently still
adheres to the strict rule, Pierce v. Schroeder, 171 Kan. 259, 232 P.2d 460 (1951).
8. Highland Ave. & B. R.R. v. South, 112 Ala. 642, 20 So. 1003 (1896) ; Lyon v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 50 Mont. 532, 148 Pac. 386 (1915); Bressler v. New York Rapid Transit
Corp., 270 N.Y. 409, 413, 1 N.E.2d 828 (1936).
9. See, e.g., Garvey v. Coleman Lamp Co., 113 Kan. 70, 213 Pac. 823 (1923).
10. Lyon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 50 Mont. 532, 148 Pac. 386 (1915).
11. See, e.g., Williams v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 625, 253 S.W.2d 97 (1952)_
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ing back to the defendant, is enough to bar his use of the doctrine. The
fundamental fallacy in this position is that it- considers res ipsa loquitur
as an alternative to direct proof rather than as a type of circumstantial
evidence to be considered by the jury in conjunction with whatever other
evidence a plaintiff may be able to offer. The result is that the plaintiff is
encouraged to suppress facts within his knowledge either because he cannot
prove them or because he does not know sufficient facts to establish defendant's
negligence directly. He is forced to elect, at the peril of his recovery, whether
he will proceed upon res ipsa loquitur or direct proof of negligence.12 When
enough facts have been established that a, jury might reasonably draw the
inference of defendant's negligence, it should not matter that the plaintiff
goes further and offers evidence of specific facts as long as those facts are
not inconsistent with the inference that defendant was negligent.
Limitation Theory
Some courts,' 3 proceeding upon the principle that proof must conform to the
pleadings, have held that a plaintiff in a res ipsa loquitur case who pleads
specific acts of negligence may use the doctrine only to establish those specific
acts and no others. The jury may infer only that the defendant was negligent
in the manner specifically set forth and the defendant need rebut only those
acts charged. It has been suggested that this is the most desirable of the various
theories14 but it is submitted that it is, in fact, subject to much the same criti-
cism as the "waiver" theory. While the "waiver" theory considers res ipsa loqui-
tur as an alternative for direct proof,, the "limitation" theory at least recognizes
its character as a rule of circumstantial evidence. The "limitation" theory
is weak in its failing to recognize the peculiar nature of the circumstances
which bring the doctrine into play. The rule that proof should conform
to the pleadings is a perfectly sound 'rule but, it is submitted, one that
should not be applied to the res1 ip9a "oquitur, case. The purpose of this
rule is to prevent a plaintiff from surprising a defendant by pleading one theory
of negligence and then attempting at the trial' to prove an entirely different
theory which the defendant is unprepared to meet. However, in the true
res ipsa loquitur case, where the plaintiff has made a general allegation
of negligence,' 5 the defendant is sufficiently apprised that he will have to meet
res ipsa loquitur as well as the specific allegations. Assuming that the
specific facts alleged are not, inconsistent with an inference of negligence, 16
12. Cf. Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944) where the court
commented upon the undesirability of penalizing the plaintiff because he places before the
court facts within his knowledge.
13. Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messingei, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168 (1934); Palmer Brick
Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 47 S.E. 329 (1904); Terre-Haute & I. R.R. v. Sheeks, 155
Ind. 74, 56 N.E. 434 (1900); Wallace v. Norris,. 310 Ky. 424, 220 S.W.2d 967 (1949);
Short v. D. R. B. Logging Co., 192 Ore. 383, 235 P.2d 340 (1951); Johnson v. Galveston,
H. & N. Ry., 27 Tex. Civ. App. 616, 66 S.W_ 906 (1902).
14. 24 L.R.A. (ns.) 788 (1910).
15. See note 18 infra.
16. See, e.g., Connor v. Atchison, _T. & S.F; 'Ry., 189 Cal. 1, 207 Pac. 378 (1922) where
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the defendant would have had to rebut them even if they had not been
specifically alleged, for, in meeting res ipsa loquitur, the defendant is forced
to rebut all probable theories upon which his negligence might be based.'7
The "limitation" theory would be valid in limiting the inference of
negligence to the precise cause of the accident if and when the plaintiff
establishes that cause by his proof. Once the jury knows the exact cause of
the accident they should not be permitted to infer negligence upon any other
grounds. If a defendant is negligent, but his negligence is not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries, no court would hold him liable for those injuries.
This should be just as true in the res ipsa loquitur case as in any other
case of negligence. The "limitation" theory suffers, however, from the defect
that it also limits plaintiff's evidence to the cause alleged. It is one thing to
say that a plaintiff, having established the exact cause, should be forced to stand
upon it. It is quite another thing to say that a plaintiff having alleged a par-
ticular cause will not be allowed to offer evidence as to other possible causes.
It is this latter aspect of the "limitation" theory that renders it less desirable
than the "surplus" theory followed in the majority of the jurisdictions.
Surplus Theory
The vast majority of jurisdictions,'" while varying in their reasoning,
take the position in a res ipsa loquitur case, that where the plaintiff
makes both a general allegation of negligence and specific allegations, he
is entitled to the full benefit of the doctrine. Some of these jurisdictions
reason that "res ipsa loquitur is used simply to establish the general alle-
gation.19 This is, in effect, treating the specific allegations as surplus.
plaintiff's specific facts tended to show that the proximate cause of the accident was an
unusually violent cloudburst.
17. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
18. Reece v. Webster, 221 Ark. 826, 256 S.W.2d 345 (1953); Leet v. Union Pac. R.R.,
25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944); Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. v. Reese, 69 Colo.
1, 169 Pac. 572 (1917); Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 175 AUt.. 679 (1934);
Krueger v. Richardson, 326 Ill. App. 205, 61 N.E.2d 399 (1945); New York, C. & St. L.
R.R. v. Henderson, - Ind. -, 146 N.E.2d 531 (1957); John Rooff & Sons, Inc. v. Winter-
bottom, - Iowa -, 86 N.W.2d 131 (1957); Cassady v. Old Colony St. Ry., 184 Mass. 156,
68 N.E. 10 (1903); Waidleich v. Andros, 182 Mich. 374, 148 N.W. 824 (1914); Heffter v.
No. States Power Co., 173 Minn. 215, 217 N.W. 102 (1927); Mares v. New Mexico Pub.
Serv. Co., 42 N.M. 473, 82 P.2d 257 (1938); McNeill v. Durham & C. R.R., 130 N.C. 256,
41 S.E. 383 (1902); Weller v. Worstall, 50 Ohio App. 11, 197 N.E. 410 (1934); Inde-
pendent E. Torpedo Co. v. Gage, 206 Okla. 108, 240 P.2d 1119 (1951); Nashville Inter-
urban Ry. v. Gregory, 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S.W. 1053 (1917); Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254 (1940); Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 100
Vt. 414, 139 At. 440 (1927); Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 S.E.
1032 (1912); D'Amico v. Conguista, 24 Wash. 2d 674, 167 P.2d 157 (1946).
Two jurisdictions apparently take the position that a general allegation must be controlled
by the specific allegations and the general allegation is treated as merely surplusage. Pierce
v. Schroeder, 171 Kan. 259, 232 P.2d 460 (1951) ; Pierce v. Great Falls & C. Ry., 22 Mont.
445, 56 Pac. 867 (1899). It should be noted, however, that both of these states hold the
waiver theory in regard to res ipsa loquitur see note 7 supra.
19. See, e.g., Feldman v. Chicago Rys. Co., 289 lI. App. 25, 124 N.E. 334 (1919).
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Other courts take the position that once res ipsa loquitur is brought into
the case by a general allegation, it remains until the precise cause of the
accident is established by other evidence. Thus the court in Cassady v. Old
Colony St. Ry 20 said, "But if at the close of the evidence the cause does not
clearly appear .. . then it is open to the plaintiff to argue upon the whole
evidence .... An unsuccessful attempt to prove by direct evidence the precise
cause does not estop the plaintiff from relyuink upon [res ipsa loquitur]."21
CONCLUSION
The limitation theory would seem, generally speaking, to be the soundest of
the three main positions 22 It is the most consistent position in respect to the
proposition that res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence. It permits
the plaintiff to plead res ipsa loquitur and, in addition, whatever specific facts of
cause and negligence he may know. It permits the jury to weigh res ipsa loqui-
tur along with whatever other evidence the plaintiff may provide. Naturally, if
the plaintiff's direct proof is sufficient to establish the negligence of the defend-
ant, the jury should predicate its verdict upon the basis of that proof and not
upon an inference. That is a question for the court in determining whether or
not it should charge res ipsa loquitur. The "surplus" theory is, it is submitted,
the most logical in that it recognizes the true nature of an inference. If it can be
said that an inference of negligence may reasonably be drawn from facts A,
B and C, there is no reason to say that merely because fact D, which is also
consistent with a finding of negligence, is added, the inference is thereby barred
or limited. If anything the inference is strengthened by the addition of other
facts consistent with it. To encourage a strengthening of the factual basis of
the inference is desirable. The "waiver" and "limitation" theories, far from
encouraging such a strengthening, discourage it and result in tempting the
plaintiff to suppress facts within his' knowledge and to seek recovery upon the
sole basis of an unenlightened inference.
One authority has summarized the problem of specific allegations and proof
as follows:
Plaintiff is of course bound by his own evidence; but proof of specific facts does not
necessarily exclude inferences. When the plaintiff shows that the railway car in
which he was a passenger was derailed, there is an inference that the defendant has
been negligent. When he goes further and shows that the derailment was caused by
an open switch, he destroys any inference of other causes, but the inference -that the
defendant has not used proper care in looking after its switches is not destroyed, but
strengthened. If he goes further still and shows that the switch was left open by a
drunken switchman on duty, there is nothing left to infer; and if he shows that the
switch was thrown by an escaped convict with a grudge against the railroad, he has
proved himself out of court. It is only in this sense that when the facts are known
there is no inference, and res ipsa loquitur vanishes from the case. 23
20. 184 Mass. 156, 68 N.E. 10 (1903).
21. Id. at 163, 68 N.E. at 12-13.
22. It is submitted that the "surplus" theory courts might adopt the view that, once
the plaintiff has proved the precise cause of the accident', the inference of negligence to
be drawn should be limited to that cause.
23. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, § 43, at 214-15.
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